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RECENT TRENDS
ENTRAPMENT
Ever since the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in United States v. Russell,' the var-
ious circuits have attempted to apply its hold-
ing regarding entrapment to numerous other
factual situations. The Court in Russell held
that the primary criterion for availability of
the entrapment defense was the absence of the
defendant's predisposition toward committing
the crime, in accord with the holdings of Sor-
rells v. United States2 and Sherman v. United
States.3 The defendant in Russell was con-
1411 U.S. 423 (1973). For an analysis of the
rationale of this case and those leading up to it
see Note, Criminal Lavw--Entrapment-Predisposi-
tion of Defendant Crucial Factor in Entrapment
Defense, 59 CORNE.L L. Rxv. 546 (1974); Note,
Criminal Law-Entrapment in the Federal Courts
-Subjective Test Reaffirmed Against Lower Court
Departures, 42 FORDHAm L. REv. 454 (1973);
Note, Entrapment, 64 J. CRim. L. & C. 407 (1973);
Note, Entrapment: Sorrells to Russell, 49 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 579 (1974); Note, Elevation of En-
trapment to a Constitutional Defense, 7 U. Micr.
J.L. REFORm 361 (1974). For a recent short com-
mentary on the state of the law on entrapment
see The Wall Street journal, Sept. 22, 1975, at 1,
col. 1.
2287 U.S. 435 (1932). The defendant was con-
victed of possessing and selling whiskey in viola-
tion of the National Prohibition Act. The defense
of entrapment was based on the government
agent's testimony of his solicitation of the defend-
ant at his home three times on the same day. The
defendant finally left and returned with a half-gal-
Ion of liquor which he sold to the agent. In the
absence of any evidence that the defendant was
predisposed, i.e., the government's evidence did not
show, for instance, that he had ever possessed or
sold any intoxicating liquor prior to the transac-
tion in question, the Supreme Court reversed his
conviction. The Court found that it was error to
hold that as a matter of law there was no entrap-
ment. It held that where the defendant was not
predisposed, and the crime was induced by the
government agent's persuasion and creative activ-
ity, the defense of entrapment was appropriate. Id.
at 442.
3 356 U.S. 369 (1958). The conviction was re-
versed because the Court found entrapment as a
matter of law. Id. at 373. As in Sorrells, the gov-
ernment's agent testified regarding the solicitation,
but here his testimony was undisputed. The de-
fendant and the government informer were both
being treated for narcotics addiction by the same
physician. The informer asked the defendant on
numerous occasions if he would supply him with
narcotics, and he finally acquiesced, providing the
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victed for the manufacture and sale of narcot-
ics. The government agent's contribution of a
legal, but scarce, ingredient in the manufacture
of methamphetamine, which was then sold to
the agent, was held to make no difference in
the application of the predisposition test.4 Be-
informer several times. Sales were made at cost
plus expenses. This lack of profit motive was of
assistance to the defendant on review of his arrest
and conviction.
The Court found error in the submission of the
issue of entrapment to the jury:
We conclude from the evidence that entrap-
ment was established as a matter of law. In
so holding, we are not choosing between con-
flicting witnesses, nor judging credibility.
Aside from recalling [the government in-
former], who was the Government's witness,
the defense called no witnesses. We reach our
conclusion from the undisputed testimony of
the prosecution's witnesses.
Id. at 373. In addition, there was no evidence of
predisposition presented; a nine-year-old sales con-
viction and five-year-old possession conviction
were held insufficient to prove readiness or predis-
position at the time of solicitation.
4 The Court explicitly refused to overrule the
primacy of the Sorrells/Sherman predisposition
test for the availability of the entrapment defense,
adding that ".. Congress may address itself to the
question and adopt any substantive definition of the
defense that it may find desirable." 411 U.S. at 433.
The entrapment defense has been held by the Su-
preme Court to be mandated by judicial interpre-
tation of Congressional (legislative) intent: Con-
gress, the Court reasoned, must have had the
purpose in mind when enacting criminal legislation
of convicting only those people who have acted of
their own volition. Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 448 (1932). See also United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973); Note, Entrap-
eient: Sorrells to Russell, 49 No=R DAME LAW.
579, 585-87 (1974).
Legislation which expressly defines entrapment
is currently in the Senate judiciary committee, as
part of the comprehensive Criminal Justice Reform
Act:
§ 551 Unlawful Entrapment.
It is a defense to prosecution under any fed-
eral statute that the defendant was not predis-
posed to commit the offense charged and did
so solely as a result of active inducement by a
federal public servant acting in his own official
capacity or by a person acting as an agent of
such a public servant or of a federal agency.
The employment of strategem or deception, or
the provision of a facility or an opportunity
for commission of an offense, or the failure to
foreclose such an opportunity, or mere solici-
tation that would not induce an ordinary law-
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cause the government showed, contrary to de-
fense testimony, that the defendant was ready
and willing to commit the crime at the time of
the agent's contact with him, the Court held
that the defense of entrapment was properly a
jury issue and upheld the jury's denial of the
defense.5
In addition, the defendant's second ground
for reversal, that the government's agent was
so "intolerably" involved in the illegal manu-
facture of methamphetamine that the dismissal
of the prosecution was mandated, was rejected
because the government-contributed ingredient
was not impossible to obtain, and its possession
was legal.6 The Russell Court labelled this sec-
ond ground as a new defense which rested on
two theories. One theory suggested a finding
of entrapment as a matter of law, regardless of
predisposition, in two types of cases: (1)
abiding persont to commit an offense, does not
in itself constitute unlawful entrapment.
S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (emphasis
added). The first sentence reaffirms the importance
of the predisposition test for availability of the en-
trapment defense, but the addition of the second
sentence causes some confusion. This bill may ar-
guably label as entrapment conduct which would
induce an ordinary law-abiding person, thus adopt-
ing the objective judicial policy test which focuses
on the government conduct, rather than the intent
of the defendant. See note 13 and accompanying
text infra.
5 The issue of entrapment is usually one for the
jury, because the defendant's evidence of solicita-
tion and the government's evidence of the defend-
ant's predisposition must be evaluated for weight
and credibility:
[T]he Courts of Appeals have since Sorrells
unanimously concluded that unless it can be
decided as a matter of law, the issue of
whether a defendant has been entrapped is for
the jury as part of its function of determining
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 377
(1958). The judge will rule that there is entrap-
ment as a matter of law if there is no evidence of
predisposition and the evidence establishing solici-
tation comes from government witnesses. Id. at
373. Some courts have also held that entrapment
at law exists when there is no evidence of predis-
position and the defendant's evidence of solicitation
is unrebutted. See note 32 and accompanying text
infra.
6 Mr. justice Rehnquist noted in the opinion of
the Court:
While we may some day be presented with a
situation in which the conduct of law enforce-
ment agents is so outrageous that due process
principles would absolutely bar the govern-
ment from invoking judicial processes to obtain
a conviction, [citation omitted], the instant
case is distinctly not of that breed.
411 U.S. at 431-32.
whenever the government supplies the contra-
band, the defendant sells the contraband to a
government agent, and the arrest is for posses-
sion, handling; and sale, as in United States v.
Bueno,7 or (2) whenever the government sup-
plies the contraband, and the arrest is for pos-
session with intent to distribute, as in United
States v. Chisuin.s The second theory was a ra-
7 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 949 (1973). A government informer supplied
the predisposed defendant, a narcotics addict, with
heroin which the defendant then sold to under-
cover agents. Entrapment was established as a
matter of law, and the conviction was reversed be-
cause the government did not meet the require-
ment, established by the Fifth Circuit, of contra-
dicting the defendant's testimony in order to
submit the issue to the jury. The court did not
allow the government to prevail by resting its case
on a challenge to the defendant's credibility. After
conviction on remand, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
because the government had produced witnesses,
including the informer-supplier, who contradicted
the defendant's testimony as to entrapment, and
whom the jury chose to believe. 470 F.2d 154, 155
(5th Cir. 1972).
8 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970). The un-
disputed facts showed that the defendant had ap-
proached a reputed counterfeiter with the intent to
buy and pass counterfeit money. The counterfeiter
then contacted the Secret Service, and a govern-
ment agent was introduced to the defendant as the
counterfeiter's associate. The agent provided the
defendant with the money and arrested him for re-
ceiving counterfeit bills with the intent to pass
them as genuine. The court found entrapment as a
matter of law, with its justification in due process
considerations, and granted the motion to dismiss
the indictment, notwithstanding the defendant's
predisposition:
Were the courts to sanction the law enforce-
ment activities committed in this case, it
would transform the laws designed to promote
the general welfare into a technique aimed at
manufacturing disobedience in order to punish,
a concept thoroughly repugnant to constitu-
tional principles. When the government sup-
plies the contraband, the receipt of which is il-
legal, the government cannot be permitted to
punish the one receiving it. To permit the
government to do so would be to countenance
violations of justice.
Id. at 1312. Although the government was the
source of the contraband, the alleged crime was
not sale, but possession with specific intent to dis-
tribute. The fact pattern differs from the Bueno
conduit case because there was no second govern-
ment agent to receive the illegal goods. See text
accompanying note 19 infra.
Because most of the courts have been confronted
with cases based on arrests for sale, not just pos-
session, the conduit rule of Bueno has been more
readily used, and the applicability of Chisum seems
to have been limited to its facts. Attempts to use
the reasoning of the case in federal courts have
been overturved on review. See, e.g., United States
v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), va-
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tionale based on excessive involvement of the
government investigator in the criminal activity.
The Court did not initially present separate dis-
cussions based on the labels used; rather it ac-
cepted the lower court's determination that
both theories are based on " . . . fundamental
concepts of due process and evince the reluct-
ance of the judiciary to countenance 'overzeal-
ous law enforcement.'" 1 It was not until later
in the opinion that the Court discussed, and
rejected, Russell's reliance on judicial policy as
establishing the defense.10
The requirements for the defense of entrap-
ment were not changed by Russell; the predis-
position test of Sherman and Sorrells contin-
ues to be universally accepted, except when
there is government involvement in the supply-
ing of contraband. The circuits remain in con-
flict regarding the evidence required to suc-
cessfully present the type of due process or
judicial policy arguments noted in Russell, re-
gardless of the results of the predisposition
test.
Before entering into a discussion of the re-
cent case law regarding entrapment, it is es-
sential to enumerate the justifications for the
entrapment defense, and note those which were
explicitly affirmed in Russell. There are three
cated, 412 U.S. 936 (1973) ; United States v. Rus-
sell, 459 F2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), reV'd, 411 U.S.
423 (1973). Cf. United States v. Mahoney, 355 F.
Supp. 418 ,E.D. La. 1973), where the court denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss but did say that
it agreed with the holding of Chisum. The court
said that case might be applicable to establish
entrapment unless the government could show
that the person to whom a seaman, who decided to
work with customs agents after receiving his sup-
ply of marijuana, delivered the contraband was the
intended recipient of the drug shipment. Because
the facts of this case arguably fit the Bueno con-
duit situation, the court's agreement with Chisum
may be dictum.
9 411 U.S. at 428, quoting United States v. Rus-
sell, 459 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1972). See also 411
U.S. at 430. The Court was again using the fifth
amendment due process clause as a means of bal-
ancing the conduct of the government against gen-
eral standards of "fundamental fairness" and"shocking to the universal sense of justice." Kin-
sella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
234, 246 (1960). See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455,
462 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
71-72 (1932). Needless to say, the standards
which have been used in applying this balancing
test are subjective and vague, contributing to the
confusion in applying the rule.
10 411 U.S. at 433-35.
sources of the entrapment defense which have
been categorized by the commentators:" (1)
legislative intent, as outlined in the majority
opinions of Sherman, Sorrells, and Russell, 2
(2) judicial policy, as proposed in the concur-
ring opinions in Sherman and Sorrells,13 and
(3) constitutional due process notions, as re-
ferred to in Russell by Mr. Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion. 14 The Russell Court both
recognized the legislative intent justification,
and said that there may come a time when the
government conduct would be so outrageous
that a defense could be developed based upon
due process considerations. Moreover, even
though it refused to sanction the non-constitu-
tionally-based objective test of the concurring
opinions of Sorrells and Sherman, which would
allow the judiciary a "chancellor's foot" veto
over law enforcement practices, 5 the Court was
not presented with, nor did it comment upon,
the fact pattern in which the government is
involved as source and purchaser of the contra-
band, with the defendant as the seller/middleman.
Although it could foresee the application of
due process principles to police conduct, the
Russell Court would not allow a reconsidera-
11 E.g., Note, Criminal Law-Entrapment-Pre-
disposition of Defendant Crucial Factor in Entrap-
ment Defense, 59 CORNEL L. REv. 546, 557-62
(1974); Note, The Viability of the Entrapment
Defense in the Constitutional Context, 59 IowA
L. REv. 655, 663-65 (1974) ; Note, Elevation of
Entrapment to a Constitutional Defense, 7 U. MIcH.
J.L. IEFORM 361, 364-69 (1974).
12 We are unable to conclude that it was the
intention of the Congress in enacting this stat-
ute that its processes of detection and enforce-
ment should be abused by the instigation by
government officials of an act on the part of
persons otherwise innocent in order to lure
them to its commission and to punish them.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448
(1932). See also Russell v. United States, 411
U.S. 423 433 435 (1973); Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
:13 The doctrine rests, rather, on a fundamental
rule of public policy. The protection of its
own functions and the preservation of the pu-
rity of its own temple belongs only to the
court. It is the province of the court and of
the court alone to protect itself and the gov-
ernment from such prostitution of the criminal
law.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457
(1932) (Roberts, J., concurring). Cf. Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 379 (1958) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
14 See note 6 supra.
'5 411 U.S. at 434-35.
19751
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tion of the basis for the entrapment defense in
that case through comparison with the consti-
tutional rationale for the exclusionary rule as
applied to illegal searches and seizures and
confessions. The analogy was "imperfect," the
Court said, because the real basis for the ex-
clusionary rule was the government's "failure
to observe its own laws." 16 The agent's con-
duct in Russell did not violate any law, nor
did it affront an independent constitutional
right of the defendant.
The Court effectively left open the situation
in which the undercover agents did engage in
illegal conduct, such as the sale of contraband.
Even if such conduct would not fall under the
proscription of an individual constitutional
right, and thus compel the court's criticism, the
court would arguably have the discretion to
condemn the unlawful police conduct on a ju-
dicial policy basis. This justification for the
entrapment rule produces an objective test
which focuses on the actions of the govern-
ment regardless of the criminal inclinations of
the defendant, just as the operation of the ex-
clusionary rule does not depend on the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. Rather it is a use
of the rationale of the concurring opinions in
Sherman and Sorrell: Such actions should not
be permitted, not because the defendant's due
process rights have been violated, but because
the police, as those who must uphold law and
order, should not be allowed to break the laws,
in an attempt to catch alleged criminals.
Prior to Russell, the Fifth Circuit in
Bueno,1 7 arguably used judicial policy as a
basis for entrapment at law 8 in defining its
"conduit rule": that entrapment is established
as a matter of law whenever the uncontra-
dicted testimony of the defendant demonstrates
that an informer furnished contraband to the
defendant, regardless of his predisposition, and
he then sold it to another government agent.
This conduit theory, which covers the fact sit-
16 Id. at 430.
17 447 F.2d at 903.
1s The decision of the court in Bueno does not
mention that the finding of entrapment at law is
constitutionally based. Commentators have agreed
that the holding of Bueno is not founded in due
process, but rather in judicial policy. See, e.g.,
Note, Elevation of Entrapment to a Constitutional
Defense, 7 U. MIcHr. J.L. REFORm 361, 372-73
(1974).
uations in which the defendant was merely the
means of transmitting illegal substances from
one hand of the government to the other, has
also been affirmed by the Fifth Circuit subse-
quent to the Russell decision.19
19 United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213,
1218 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W.
3201 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975) (defendant's claim that the
government informer was the source of his mari-
juana would, if proven, suffice as entrapment at
law, even if the informer did not receive the mari-
juana from the government); United States v.
Mosley, 496 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir.), aff'd on
rehearing, 505 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1974) (when
contradictory testimony exists as to the source
of the contraband sold by the defendant, the issue
of entrapment should properly be submitted to
the jury, even though the defendant was found
to be predisposed; in short, defendant may be
acquitted, even though disposed, when the under-
cover agent supplies him with the contraband);
United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161, 163 (5th
Cir. 1974) (once defendant has assumed his burden
of going forth with evidence that the government
was the source of his contraband, the government
has the burden of showing beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not obtain the contra-
band from the informer) ; United States v. Worko-
pich, 479 F.2d 1142, 1144-45 (5th Cir. 1973) (gov-
ernment's conduct of soliciting defendant and
supplying legal currency to enable him to purchase
heroin was not entrapment at law because the cur-
rency supplied was legal, not contraband, and the
defendant did not obtain the heroin from a govern-
ment agent, and then sell it to another, i.e, there
was no conduit).
A limit has been placed on the application of the
conduit rule by United States v. Rodriguez, 474
F.2d 587, 589 (5th Cir. 1973), which held that
when the prospective seller (defendant) received
cocaine from his brother, who in turn received it
from a government informer, entrapment at law
was not established because the government source
was one step removed.
The Fifth Circuit has also constrained the op-
portunity of the defendant to raise the constitu-
tional defense of outrageous government conduct,
which was based on Russell. United States v.
Arias-Diaz, 497 F.2d 165, 169 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975). The defendants
had a source of marijuana in Columbia and paid
the undercover agent to fly there and pick it up.
The defendants were arrested near the airport,
after they had received the marijuana from the
agent, and were charged with possession. No
constitutionally offensive government involvement
or entrapment at law was found.
In spite of these limitations, a three-judge panel
of the Fifth Circuit has unanimously stated:
"Thus the law of this Circuit is that a defendant,
where entrapment is an issue, may be acquitted for
lack of predisposition, or, even though disposed,
where the undercover agent supplies him with the
contraband." United States v. Mosley, supra at
1016. Although the court does not explicitly state
that the contraband must then be sold to a gov-
ernment agent to complete the conduit, this can be
[Vol. 66
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Until recently, the other circuits had fol-
lowed Russell strictly, using the predisposition
of the defendant as the basis for determining
whether the defense of entrapment could be
used.20 Now, however, the Third Circuit has
sanctioned the Fifth Circuit case law with the
holding in United States v. West 21 that entrap-
ment was proven under the Bueno conduit rule
as well as under the Russell predisposition test.
West was a heroin pusher who, as the gov-
ernment admitted, had no history of previous
involvement in narcotics distribution. The ma-
jority found two grounds for reversing the
lower court's conviction of West. First, there
was not adequate proof of West's predisposi-
tion to sell heroin. He had been gainfully em-
ployed and the prosecution conceded that he
was a first-time offender. Moreover, the four
transactions with government agents within a
ten-day period were all part of a scheme pro-
posed by the government agent, and thus the
first sale could not be used to show a predispo-
sition for the next three transactions.22
Second, the case was definitely of the Bueno
genre: uncontradicted evidence showed that
one government agent secured the heroin
which the defendant later sold to another gov-
inferred from the facts of that case and the cases
which the court cited. Id. at 1014, 1016. Mosley al-
leged that a government agent had provided him
with the heroin which he then sold to an under-
cover agent. His conviction was reversed because
the trial court denied the request for a Bueiw-type
instruction, even though the jury found the defend-
ant to be predisposed.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 508 F2d
1157, 1159 (7th Cir., cert. denied, 421 U.S. 980
(1975) (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., dissenting);
United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 876-78
(7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Jett, 491 F.2d
1078, 1081 (1st Cir. 1974). The Tenth Circuit used
the strict predisposition test even before the
Supreme Court decided Russell. Martinez v. United
States, 373 F.2d 810, 812 (10th Cir. 1967). Other
courts strongly disagreed with the primacy of the
predisposition test, also before Russell. United
States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307, 1311-12 (C.D.
Cal. 1970); People v. Strong, 21 111. 2d 320, 323,
172 N.E.2d 765, 768 (1961).
21 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975). The Third Cir-
cuit law prior to West contained the general rule
that entrapment occurs only when the criminal
conduct was the product of the creative activity
(inducement) of law enforcement officials upon an
innocent person, i.e., if the defendant is predis-
posed to commit the crime, he cannot use the en-
trapment defense. United States v. Silver, 457 F.2d
1217, 1219 (3d Cir. 1972).
22 511 F.2d at 1086.
ernment agent.23 The defendant's involvement
appeared to be limited to accepting and carry-
ing out one agent's proposal to sell the overcut
or fake heroin. The court explicitly approved
of the Bueno and Mosley decisions of the Fifth
Circuit,2 4 yet it did not mention entrapment at
law or due [process. Its justification for the
conduit rule arguably is founded in notions of
the social objectives of law enforcement, sum-
marized by a holding that the conduct of the
government was intolerable:
But when the government's own agent has set
the accused up in illicit activity by supplying
him with narcotics and then introducing him
to another government agent as a prospective
buyer, the role of the government has passed
the point of toleration. Moreover, such con-
duct . . . serves no justifying social objective.
Rather, it puts the law enforcement authorities
in the position of creating new crime....
[W]e view West's case as one of intolerable
conduct by government agents, one supplying
and the other buying the narcotics .... 25
Although the adoption of the Bueno rule may
be read as dictum in this case, it may be the
harbinger of a significant trend in that it is
the first non-Fifth Circuit opinion after Russell
to accept the conduit theory.
The dissent in West argued that because of
a procedural deficiency the court should not
find entrapment as a matter of law.2 6 Although
the government did not rebut the defense testi-
mony regarding the governmental source of
the contraband, Judge Weis, citing Masciale
v. United States,2 7 would have allowed the
trial court to judge the weight and credibility
of the defendant's testimony in deciding
23 This case is unusual in that the uncontra-
dicted evidence shows a confederation of two
government agents, one an informer who, ac-
cording to uncontradicted testimony, actually
supplied the narcotics in question and the
other an undercover officer who, as pre-
arranged with the informer, bought this contra-
band from the accused third person whom the
informer had persuaded to join with him in a
selling venture.
Id. at 1085.
24 Id. See notes 7 and 19 supra.
25 511 F.2d at 1085-86.
261d. at 1088-89 (Weis, J., dissenting).
27 356 U.S. 386, 388 (1958), aff'g 236 F.2d 601




whether the entrapment defense should be al-
lowed. The majority attempted to distinguish
Masciale on the basis that there was contradic-
tory, albeit indirect, government testimony re-
garding inducement in that case. Yet a close
reading of the language of the Court indicates
otherwise.
28
28 Two agents were involved in Masciale, but on
the same side of the transaction-as buyers, not
sellers. The defendant had conceded that the jury
could have found that he was predisposed when he
met the second agent, on the strength of his boast-
ing of knowledge of someone "high up in the nar-
cotics traffic." 356 U.S. at 388. Yet the govern-
ment did not contradict Masciale's testimony
regarding the inducement of the first government
agent, whom he met prior to his announcement of
predisposition to the second agent. 236 F.2d at
602-03. The Supreme Court held:
Petitioner argues that this undisputed testi-
mony explained why he was willing to deal
with [the second government agent] and so
established entrapment as a matter of law.
However, this testimony alone could not have
this effect. While petitioner presented enough
evidence for the jury to consider, they were
entitled to disbelieve him in regard to [the
first government agent-informer] and so find
for the Government on the issue of guilt.
Therefore, the trial court properly submitted
the case to the jury.
356 U.S. at 388.
In fact, the First Circuit in United States v.
Jett, 491 F.2d 1078, 1080 n.3 (1st Cir. 1974) had
previously accused the Fifth Circuit of falling
short in its analysis by failing to take notice of
Masciale when it held in Bueio that the govern-
ment had the burden of introducing evidence to di-
rectly contradict the defendant's testimony in a
conduit situation. In Jett the court did find sub-
stantial evidence warranting a finding of predispo-
sition, and thus did not reach the Masciale ques-
tion, since the defendant's evidence in Jett was
contradicted by the government.
The Fifth Circuit did review the procedural rule
of Masciale in United States v. Workopich, 479
F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1973), and made the general
statement:
Thus, when the undisputed testimony of a de-
fendant is the sole basis for an entrapment de-
fense, entrapment is not established as a mat-
ter of law but rather is an issue for the jury
to decide. Accord, United States v. Burgess, 5
Cir. 1970, 433 F.2d 987. Cf. United States v.
Bueno, 5 Cir. 1971, 447 F.2d 903, where, when
the government supplied contraband to the de-
fendant, his uncontradicted testimony estab-
lished entrapment as a matter of law.
rd. at 1146. Even though this quote does not ex-
plicitly mention the conduit situation, it must be
understood that in Bueito the government-supplied
contraband was then sold to a government agent.
Therefore, this citation of Bueno seems to estab-
lish a different procedural rule (from Masciale)
when the conduit theory is alleged. The procedural
rule noted in Bueno could not be used in the
Workopich case because the facts establishing the
Bueno conduit situation were not shown.
The real problem in interpreting Masciale is
that it is difficult to ascertain whether the deci-
sion states a general rule of law, or merely in-
dicates that the defendant's evidence in that
case was deficient per se because it was infer-
ential and sketchy.29 Some courts have held
that, following Masciale, the defense is not es-
tablished as a matter of law when the only evi-
dence of entrapment is the defendant's own
testimony.30 The Fifth Circuit subscribes to
that general rule in most cases3 ' but carves out
In addition, the Burgess case cited in the quote
also involved, like Workopich, a non-conduit fact
situation, in which predisposition was the key
issue. The untaxed liquor which the defendant sold
to the undercover agent was not obtained from the
government. The agent had pleaded with the de-
fendant to sell him whiskey so that he could resell
it to obtain money for his allegedly ill and hungry
family. The court, in a per curiam decision, upheld
the jury's decision to believe the government's evi-
dence of no entrapment, without stating the nature
of that convincing evidence. United States v.
Burgess, 433 F.2d 987, 988 (5th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam).
This somewhat ambiguous language in Worko-
pich was clarified in United States v. Gomez-Ro-
jas, 507 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
44 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975), in which the
court affirmed the existence of the different proce-
dural rule to be used with the conduit theory,
without specifically mentioning Masciale. Although
the evidence in the trial court was sufficient to go
to the jury because the government contradicted
the defendant's evidence on the source of the con-
traband, and the defendant's conviction was re-
versed because of an erroneous jury instruction,
the court said in its analysis:
[I]f the defendant establishes a prima facie
case of a transaction of the Bueno variety,
then the Government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the objective facts nec-
essary to a Bueiw defense did not occur. Once
the Government comes forward with evidence
that the defendant was not entrapped, then the
case may go to the jury. United States v.
Oquendo, supra.
In an ordinary entrapment case, the Govern-
ment will seek to demonstrate the defendant's
predisposition by pointing to the defendant's
conduct and to his reputation for dealing in
contraband. See United States v. Russell,
supra. In a Bueno-type case, however, the Gov-
ernment's task is more difficult. It may not
rely solely on the jury's decision to believe or
not to believe the defendant's story.
Id. at 1218.
29 United States v. Masciale, 236 F.2d 601, 603
(2d Cir. 1956), aff'd, 356 U.S. 386 (1958).
30 E.g., United States v. Johnson, 495 F.2d 242,
244 (10th Cir. 1974) (defendant claims that in-
former supplied him with contraband); United
States v. Jett, 491 F.2d 1078, 1080 (1st Cir. 1974)
(dictum).
31 United States v. Burgess, 433 F.2d 987, 988
(5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
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an exception when the government supplies
contraband to the defendant who later sells it
to a government agent. "In a Bueno-type case
... [the government] may not rely solely on
the jury's decision to believe or not to believe
the defendant's story." 32
Two other circuits have recently followed
the predisposition test only. The Eighth Cir-
cuit expressly rejected the Bueno rule in
United States v. Hampton.33 In United States
v. Spivey34 the government's illegal conduct
was found not to be violative of the due proc-
ess test as outlined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist
in RusseU.
Hampton allegedly proposed a plan to sell a
"pollutant"-a non-narcotic closely resembling
heroin in appearance-to gullible acquaintances
of a government informer. However, the in-
former then supplied heroin to Hampton, who
sold the narcotics to undercover agents posing
as friends of the informer. Hampton claimed
that he mistakenly believed that the heroin was
the alleged pollutant.35
The facts of this case seemed to compel the
application of the Buenw rule: although the de-
fendant was allegedly predisposed, he had testi-
fied that the government agent supplied him
with the contraband. But the court said: "We
believe that the Supreme Court's opinion in
Russell forecloses us from considering any
theory other than predisposition with respect
to Hampton's entrapment defense." 3 6 The
court did not clearly enunciate the basis for
the entrapment doctrine which the defendant
suggested as a defense, but the defendant, in
his appeal, stated that his "government conduct
32United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213,
1218 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W.
3201 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975). See note 28 supra.
33507 F.2d 832, 834-36. (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975). Question presented:
"Does Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause bar
,defendant's conviction for selling contraband sup-
plied by Government?" 43 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S.
Apr. 15, 1975).
34 508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
949 (1975).
35 The jury accepted the testimony of the gov-
ernment informer that Hampton knew that he was
selling heroin. 507 F2d at 836 n.4.
36 Id. at 835. Judge Heaney strongly dissented
on the grounds that this Bueno situation, in which
"'...the government buy[s] heroin from itself,
through an intermediary, the defendant, and then
charges] him with the crime. is the type of
outrageous conduct which Mr. Justice Rehnquist
theory" had its origins in the concurring opin-
ions of SorrelUs and Sherman.37 The court's si-
lence on the source of Hampton's defense is
tantamount to agreement that the defense has
judicial policy as at least one of its justifica-
tions. The Hampton opinion thus precludes the
application of the Bueno rule in the Eighth
Circuit, if the defense contends that the rule is
based on judicial policy.
It would seem that the court's ambiguity
could arguably allow the government'conduct
defense to be raised if due process notions
were presented as its justification. But in light
of the rationale of the cases cited by the ma-
jority as controlling, and the closing criticism
of the dissenting judge,38 a due process argu-
ment based on the conduit fact pattern is also
foreclosed.
Judge Bright's majority opinion viewed the
Supreme Court's remand of United States v.
McGrath to the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit,3 9 and the subsequent affirmance
of the conviction for failure to establish, in the
record or briefs, either the defense of entrap-
ment or of outrageous government conduct
which affronted due process principles, 40 as
undermining the validity of the Bueno hold-
ing.41- The conviction in McGrath was not
only for conspiracy to produce and pass coun-
terfeit obligations, to which the entrapment de-
fense was not applicable because the defendants
initiated the conspiracy, but also for unlawful
possession of the currency. Regarding the lat-
ter count, the court found that the government
agents arranged for and supervised the print-
ing of the bills, and then delivered them to the
defendant.42 Such involvement of the govern-
in Russell recognized would be violative of due
process requirements. Id. at 837 (Heaney, J., dis-
senting), quoting United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d
903, 905 (5th Cir. 1971).
37 507 F2d at 834.
38 In the future, it is difficult to see how any
defendant in this Circuit can possibly raise the
due process defense which the Russell Court
sought to leave open.
Id. at 837 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
39412 U.S. 936 (1973), vacating 468 F.2d 1027
(7th Cir. 1972). The Court remanded for further
consideration in light of United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973).
40 494 F.2d 562,563 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
41 507 F.2d at 835-36.




ment agents in McGrath would seem to be
even greater than that in Bueno or Hampton
where the government was only the source of
the contraband, not the mastermind for its
manufacture. In light of the influential prece-
dents of Russell and McGrath, the court would
not allow an entrapment defense based on gov-
ernment conduct, either because of judicial pol-
icy or due process notions, but rather held the
defendant's predisposition determinative in de-
nying the defense and upholding his convic-
tion.
The Tenth Circuit, which has previously in-
dicated that absence of predisposition is the
key requirement for allowing an entrapment
defense,43 demonstrated how difficult it is to
establish that the government conduct was a
denial of fundamental fairness guarantees of
the due process clause. In United States v.
Spivey,4 4 the government informer violated
both federal and state criminal statutes by pos-
sessing and giving the defendant marijuana in
an attempt to obtain his trust and confidence.
He was also generous with his home, food, and
money.4 5 However, the defendant, a "ready
and willing seller of heroin," 46 had independ-
ent sources of heroin, and sold it on two sepa-
rate occasions to government agents, out of the
presence of the informer. The court definitely
concluded that the illegality of the informer's
conduct, without more, did not affront due
The Government's proof demonstrated that the
defendant, with the assistance of several other
persons, embarked upon a scheme to print
over one million dollars in counterfeit twenty
dollar bills. At some point in the scheme, the
Secret Service discovered the plan. Agents
then infiltrated the defendant's conspiracy and
effectively took direction of it. Prior to this
point, the evidence shows that the defendant
had purchased rag paper and ink of the type
and color necessary to duplicate paper cur-
rency and had made inquiries about a printer.
There is little dispute, however, that once the
agents had infiltrated the ring, they exercised
substantial control over its course. Not only
did they arrange for and supervise the actual
printing of the counterfeit bills, but they also
determined how and when they would be de-
livered to the defendant.
468 F.2d at 1028.
43 Martinez v. United States, 373 F.2d 810, 812
(10th Cir. 1967).
44 508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
949 (1975).
45 Id. at 148.
46 Id. at 151.
process principles.4 7 Therefore it did not allow
the defendant to claim the Russell-originated
constitutional defense of outrageous govern-
ment conduct; yet it did not give any objective
standards to test the availability of the due
process arguments.
The more compelling aspect of this Tenth
Circuit opinion is the statement that the gov-
ernment's conduct was not ". . . postured as
connected in some way to the commission of
the acts for which the defendant stands
convicted." 4  The government conduct was
allegedly limited to providing a home, food,
marijuana, and money to the defendant, and
introducing him to the government agent-
purchasers. The defendant conducted the sales
by himself, was not threatened or coerced
by the agents, and did not act pursuant to a
governmental design. As the Tenth Circuit
concluded, illegal government conduct is not
enough to constitute entrapment at law on con-
stitutional grounds, when there is no nexus to
the allegedly criminal activity of the defendant.
But if such a connection could be shown, the
court inferred that it would entertain the argu-
ment:
[T]he more immediate the impact of the gov-
ernment's conduct upon the particular defend-
ant, the more vigorously would be applied
Russell's test for constitutional impropriety.
40
Thus it may be possible for a defendant in the
Tenth Circuit to successfully present a due
process defense if it is within the context of the
conduit fact pattern, where the impact of the
government conduct is to provide him with the
contraband, the sale of which will lead to his
arrest.50
The effect of these opinions is an acknowl-
edgment of the willingness of some circuits to
47 Nevertheless, Russell did not establish-nor
does it now require us to formulate-a fixed
rule that would preclude, for due process rea-
sons, the prosecution of the defendant here
because the government's informer engaged in
unlawful conduct.
Id. at 149. For Russell's acknowledgment of the
possibility of due process violations in this context
see note 6 supra.
48 508 F.2d at 149.49 Id. at 150.
50 The Spivey court leaves this possibility open
when it cites the Bueno and other Fifth Circuit
"government-supplied contraband" cases in a foot-
note as an example of cases in which the govern-
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use an objective test to determine the availabil-
ity of the entrapment defense, by focusing on
the law enforcement conduct, and justifying
the defense in either judicial policy or due
process notions. On the other hand, the major-
ity of the circuits still require the use of the
subjective test of the intent of the defendant-
his predisposition-and see the Russell case as
a bar to asserting entrapment or intolerable
conduct in the Bueno situation where the de-
fendant is predisposed to commit the crime. It
remains for the Supreme Court to provide
guidance by deciding whether the "intolerable"
government conduct by reason of the conduit
situation is enough to reverse the defendant's
conviction, even though he probably would
have committed the crime without the govern-
ment's assistance in becoming his source of the
contraband. In addition the Court has yet to
provide standards for application of the outra-
geous government conduct/due process test
outlined in Russell. Perhaps these will be pro-
vided when Hampton is decided by the Supreme
Court on review.5' In the absence of the latter
standards, the Fifth Circuit seems to be con-
tent to continue to reaffirm that the conduit
fact pattern affronts its judicial concepts of
fairness and proper police action.
An expansion of this rationale into the other
circuits, commencing with the West case in the
Third Circuit, is desirable, and this rule, based
on judicial policy, is the clearest path of action
which has been charted, in the absence of con-
stitutional due process standards, for courts
who want to justify their finding of outrageous
or intolerable government conduct in a conduit
situation. Without any necessity for correlating
a criticism of the conduct of the police to con-
stitutional notions, the courts should be at lib-
erty to make the determination that certain po-
lice conduct is not proper, regardless of the
person to whom it is directed. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in
Sherman, convincingly summarized the import
of this argument:
ment connection has been measured by "... the
extent to which the government instigated, partici-
pated in, or was involved or enmeshed in, the
criminal activity itself." Id. at 150 n.3 and accom-
panying text.
51 See note 33 supra.
Public confidence in the fair and honorable
administration of justice, upon which ulti-
mately depends the rule of law, is the tran-
scending value at stake.
No matter what the defendant's past record
and present inclinations to criminality, or the
depths to which he has sunk in the estimation
of society, certain police conduct to ensnare
him into further crime is not to be tolerated
by an advanced society.52
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
In the post-Watergate era, public attention
has focused as never before on the purported
attempts of various government bodies to spy
on private citizens. In several major cities, for
example, reports of police intelligence gather-
ing, directed at political enemies of parties in
power, have filled the news media,53 causing
citizens concerned about the prying eye of "Big
Brother" to ask if a solution to the problem of
government surveillance can be found in the law.
In White v. Davis,5 4 the California Supreme
Court held that a state and local taxpayer had
the requisite standing to seek an injunction
against alleged illegal expenditures of public
funds by a chief of police in connection with
police undercover activities at the University
of California at Los Angeles.55 Observing that
the campus is the "sacred ground of free
discussion," 5 6 the court also found that facts
alleged by the plaintiff showed a prima facie
violation of constitutional guarantees of free
speech and assembly5 7 and the right of privacy
52 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380,
382-83 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
53 See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, June 4, 1975, § 1,
at 1, col. 4.
54 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1975).
55 Id. at 762-65, 533 P.2d at 225-27, 120 Cal.
Rptr. at 97-99. This state and local taxpayer stand-
ing would apparently not allow suits against federal
officers to prevent expenditure of federal funds.
Such suits would require federal taxpayer standing
to attack surveillance, which so far does not exist.
For the most extensive grant of federal taxpayer
standing to date see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968).
56 Id. at 770, 533 P.2d at 231, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
103.
57 Id. at 765-73, 533 P.2d at 227-32, 120 Cal.
Rptr. at 99-104. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
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set forth in a recently adopted provision of the
California Constitution. 58 Since the Supreme
Court of the United States in Laird v.
Taturn 59 held that a citizen cannot, without
specific injury, challenge in federal courts the
legality of government investigative activity,
60
California may now, for the first time, be set-
ting an example which other states will follow
in providing an effective remedy for the gen-
eral public against much undesired government
snooping.
In Laird, plaintiffs, alleging the existence of
covert United States Army intelligence-gather-
ing operations directed at lawful civilian politi-
cal activity, sought to enjoin the alleged
spying because it had a "chilling effect," which
discouraged them from exercising their first
amendment rights.6 ' A five-man majority for
the Court held that a citizen must allege a
more specific injury than mere surveillance to
challenge such government activities.
6 2
In Bagley v. Los Angeles,6 3 a California
federal court followed the Laird prece-
dent in dismissing a complaint challenging the
very police surveillance activities at issue in
White v. Davis.64 As in White, the plaintiff al-
leged that members of the Los Angeles police
department, with the chief's authorization,
were serving as secret informers and under-
cover agents at U.C.L.A. by registering as stu-
dom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
The provisions of the first amendment are applica-
ble to the states by reason of the fourteenth
amendment. National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
460-61 (1958); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
707 (1931). CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2 contains a simi-
lar provision for freedom of speech and assembly.
5 13 Cal. 3d at 773-76, 533 P.2d at 232-35, 120
Cal. Rptr. at 104-07. CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 1
reads :
All people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights. Among these are
enjoying and defending life and liberty, ac-
quiring, possessing, and protecting property,
and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness,
and privacy.
59 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
O Id. at 15.
6G Id. at 2.
62 Id. at 10.
63 No. 71-166-JWC (S.D. Cal. 1971).
64 13 Ca. 3d at 763, 533 P.2d at 226, 120 Cal.
Rptr. at 98.
dents, attending classes, and submitting reports
of class discussions to the police department. 65
With the federal courts effectively closed to
suits by citizens challenging the mere existence
of illegal surveillance, Hayden White, a pro-
fessor at U.C.L.A., took his taxpayer's suit
against the Los Angeles chief of police to the
California state courts. On appeal from a dis-
missal of the complaint, the state supreme
court applied section 526a of the California
Code of Civil Procedure to grant standing,6"
noting that the same provision was used to
confer standing in 1948 on a taxpayer chal-
lenging dragnet police blockades67 and in 1957
on a taxpayer seeking a remedy for illegal
electronic surveillance by police.68 The court
held that under section 526a no showing of
special damage to the taxpayer is necessary
when he challenges state or local government
action, the primary purpose of the section
being "'to enable a large body of the citizenry
to challenge governmental action which would
otherwise go unchallenged in the courts be-
cause of the standing requirement.' "69
By holding that White had standing as a
taxpayer to seek an injunction against the ex-
penditure of public funds for illegal purposes
by state or local officials, the California Su-
preme Court blazed a trail which courts in
other states could easily follow to curb govern-
ment snooping. Taxpayers' suits have been rec-
ognized as a common law right in some
states.7 0 Other American jurisdictions have
statutes similar to section 526a of the Califor-
65 Id. at 761-62, 764, 533 P.2d at 225, 226, 120
Cal. Rptr. at 97, 98.
6 Id. at 764, 533 P.2d at 227, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
99. Relevant portions of section 526a provide:
An action to obtain a judgment, restraining
and preventing any illegal expenditure of ...
funds . . . of a county, town, city or city and
county of the state, may be maintained against
any officer thereof . . . by a citizen resident
therein....
CAL. CiV. PRO. CODE § 526a (West 1954).
67 Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 193
P.2d 470 (1948).
68 Wirin v. Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 313 P.2d 844
(1957).
69 13 Cal. 3d at 764-65, 533 P.2d at 227, 120
Cal. Rptr. at 99, quoting Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.
3d 258, 267--68, 486 P.2d 1242, 1246, 96 Cal. Rptr.
42, 48 (1971).
70 See, e.g., Appeal of Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
123 Ind. App. 358, 109 N.E2d 620 (1952) ; Ever-




nia Code of Civil Procedure, specifically pro-
viding for taxpayers' suits.71 Finally, the
courts in several jurisdictions have liberally in-
terpreted the language of state statutes so as to
provide for such litigation.
7 2
Although the laws of many states would sup-
port taxpayer actions such as White's
the California Supreme Court in his case
did extend the right of taxpayer suit to a
situation in which it had rarely been exercised.
Taxpayer actions have often been brought to
prevent the levying of illegal taxes, 73 to pre-
vent the payment of public funds to persons
not authorized to receive them,7 4 and to avoid
illegal contracts entered into by state and local
governments. 75 But seldom have they been
brought to prevent unlawful official surveil-
lance. Government spying has primarily been
challenged by persons who have been specifi-
cally damaged by the spying activities.
76
The White case is also unusual and impor-
tant in that the surveillance involved in that
case was challenged as violating constitutional
rights which have seldom been asserted
in court against government undercover activ-
ity, that is, freedom of speech and assembly
and the right to privacy. As the court in
White noted,77 the most familiar limitations on
police investigatory and surveillance activities
are the search and seizure restrictions and
warrant restrictions found in the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution
and in many state constitutions.78 The Su-
71 See, e.g., IL. RE V. ST.r. ch. 102, § 11 (1973);
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 29, § 63 (1932); OHio
REV. CODE ch. 723, § 59 (1964) ; V.I. CODE ANN.
tit. 5, § 80 (1957).
7?See, e.g., Hollis v. Piggott Junior Chamber
of Commerce, Inc., 248 Ark. 725, 453 S.W.2d 410
(1970).
73 See, e.g., Knopf v. First Nat. Bank, 173 II.
331, 50 N.E. 660 (1898).
74See J.D.L. Corp. v. Bruckman, 171 Misc. 3,
11 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1939).
75 See, e.g., Henderson v. McCormick, 70 Ariz.
19, 215 P.2d 608 (1950).
76 See, e.g., People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506
P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
77 13 Cal. 3d at 766, 533 P.2d at 228, 120 Cal.
Rptr. at 100.
78 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place
preme Court of the United States has rejected
the contention that government surveillance in
"domestic security" cases is immune from
fourth amendment proscriptions, 7 9 and over the
years many on-going police intelligence opera-
tions have been halted for violation of the
rights protected by that amendment and by
similar state provisions.s ' In many situations,
however, citizens may be in a better position to
claim that their freedom of speech or right to
privacy has been violated than to rely on
search and seizure and warrant requirements.
In holding that the allegations in White's
complaint stated a prima facie infringement of
the freedom of speech and assembly guaran-
teed by the constitutions of the United States
and Calfornia,8 ' the California Supreme Court
distinguished the investigation of specific crim-
inal activity by undercover government agents
from the kind of surveillance of routine and
continuous lawful activities alleged in the case
at bar.8 2 The court also cited United States
Supreme Court cases indicating that to com-
pel an individual to disclose his political ideas
or affiliations to the government is to deter his
exercise of first amendment rights, 3 and that
police surveillance of university classrooms is
particularly suspect from a constitutional
standpoint.8 4 The defendant's claim that the
to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
The fourth amendment applies directly to rights of
the people against the federal government. The
provisions of the fourth amendment are made ap-
plicable to the states by reason of the fourteenth
amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55
(1961).
79 United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407
U.S. 297 (1972).
80 See, e.g., Wirin v. Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 313
P.2d 844 (1957).
sl The court admitted that comparable federal
and state constitutional provisions for the freedoms
of speech and assembly are not necessarily co-
extensive, but it did not explore potential variances
in White. 13 Cal. 3d at 767, 533 P.2d at 228, 120
Cal. Rptr. at 100.
82 13 Cal. 3d at 765, 533 P.2d at 227, 120 Cal.
Rptr. at 99.
83 Id. at 768, 533 P.2d at 229, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
101. The cases cited included Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1960) ; and National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958). Both pointed out that se-
crecy can sometimes be essential to the organiza-
tion of effective dissent. 362 U.S. at 64; 357 U.S.
at 462.
84 13 Cal. 3d at 768-69, 533 P.2d at 229-30, 120
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semi-public nature of a -university classroom
negates any claim of first amendment infringe-
ment was rejected by the court. Instead, the
court reasoned that the risk a student takes in
speaking in class that other students will re-
cord his statement and remember it in the fu-
ture is qualitatively different from that posed
by a police surveillance system involving the
filing of reports in permanent police records.8 5
As a result of the alleged infringement on the
freedoms of speech and assembly, the court
found that the defendant would have the heavy
burden of showing that his actions bore a nec-
essary relation to a compelling state interest.8 6
This burden would be all the heavier, accord-
ing to the court, because of alleged intrusion
into the particularly sacrosanct environs of a
university classroom and because White al-
leged that information gathered by the police
through their operations at U.C.L.A. pertained
to no "illegal activity or acts." s7
By finding a prima facie infringement of the
freedoms of speech and assembly guaranteed by
the constitutions of the United States and Cali-
fornia, the court in White v. Davis, as it had done
in finding standing to sue, established a proce-
dure courts in other states could easily follow in
curbing government spying. Most, if not all,
state constitutions contain provisions guar-
anteeing the freedom of speech and assembly.
And, of course, the United States Constitu-
tion's provisions, including those for free
speech and assembly, are applicable throughout
the nation.
Cal. Rptr, at 101-02: The cases cited included
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ;
and Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957). All mentioned, in one way or another, that
the classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of
ideas" where the nation's future leaders must be
trained through the robust exchange of views. 385
U.S. at 603; 364 U.S. at 487; 354 U.S. at 250.
85 13 Cal. 3d at 768 n.4, 533 P.2d at 229 n.4, 120
Cal. Rptr. at 101 n.4.
86 Id. at 772, 533 P.2d at 232, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
104.
S7 Id. at 773, 533 P.2d at 232, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
104. Compare the court's treatment of the free
speech issue in White with that of the court in
Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, No.
74-2640 (2d Cir. Dec. 29, 1974), where a suit was
unsuccessfully brought to enjoin the Director of
the F.B.I. and his agents from conducting secret
surveillance of a convention of the Young Socialist
Alliance. There it was contended by the Socialist
In finding that the facts alleged by White
also constituted a prima facie violation of the
California Constitution's right of privacy pro-
vision, the court held that the principal mis-
chiefs at which the -provision was aimed were:
(1) 'government snooping' and the secret gath-
ering of personal information; (2) the over-
broad collection and retention of unnecessary
personal information by government and busi-
ness interests; (3) the improper use of infor-
mation properly obtained for a specific pur-
pose . . .; and (4) the lack of a reasonable
check on the accuracy of existing records.
88
The court also found that the constitutional
provision, like most constitutional restraints,
does not prohibit all government incursions on
individual privacy, but creates a right of pri-
vacy enforceable by the individual citizen only
when the government action cannot be justi-
fied by a compelling state interest.89 As with
regard to the alleged violations of the freedom
of speech and assembly, the court found that
the defendant would face a heavy burden at
trial in establishing the legality of his actions.
By finding a prima facie violation of the Cali-
fornia Constitution's right of privacy pro-
vision, the court in White also found a means
of attacking government snooping that
courts in other states could use. The
great majority of American courts that have
taken a position on the matter have held that
there is a right of privacy at common law,90
although in several states there are statutes
limiting the right of privacy to a cause of ac-
tion for the use of one's name or picture for
Workers Party that surveillance of the convention
activities by the F.B.I. would have a "chilling ef-
fect" on free expression at the convention and that
knowledge of probable F.B.I. surveillance would
discourage attendance at the convention, as it had
at previous ones held by the Y.S.A. The court re-
fused to prohibit surveillance, however, on condi-
tion that the F.B.I. refrain from transmitting the
names of persons attending the convention to the
Civil Service Commission.
88 13 Cal. 3d at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal.
Rptr. at 106.
89 Id.
90 See Annot., 14 A.L.R. 2d 750 (1950) ; Annot.,
168 A.L.R. 446 (1947); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22
(1942). Intrusion upon a person's seclusion or sol-
itude, or into his private affairs is generally recog-
nized as an invasion of the common law right of
privacy, and government snooping would certainly
seem to fit under that description.
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purposes of advertising or trade without one's
consent.91 There are even a few states, in addi-
tion to California, which provide a right of pri-
vacy in their constitutions,92 and the United
States Constitution has been said to provide a
right of privacy which is binding on all of the
states through the fourteenth amendment.93
In conclusion, the California Supreme Court
has set a precedent in White v. Davis which
may lead to an increasing number of taxpayer
suits being filed in state courts across the
91 See Annot., 14 A.L.R. 2d 750 (1950) ; Annot.,
168 A.L.R. 446 (1947); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22
(1942).
92 For examples of other state constitutional
provisions mentioning a right to privacy, see Aiz.
CoNsT. art. 2, § 8; HAwAn CONsT. art. 1, § 5;
ILL. CoNsT. art. 1, §§ 6, 12; WASH. CONsT. art. 1,
§ 7. None of these constitutional provisions has yet
been used to invalidate government snooping.
Some have been said to have the same effect as
the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
and to confer no additional rights. See, e.g., Cluff
v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 10 Ariz. App.
560, 460 P2d 666 (1969).
93 In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), the Supreme Court suggested that a right
of privacy exists in the penumbra emanating from
the first amendment freedoms of speech and as-
country to enjoin, on grounds of infringement
of the freedom of speech and assembly and/or
the right to privacy, expenditures of state and
local funds for government surveillance. A
reversal of the United States Supreme Court
decision in Laird v. Tatum, allowing taxpayer
suits to be brought in federal courts, would
further advance the cause of providing a legal
solution to government spying on innocent pri-
vate citizens. So would the granting of stand-
ing to federal taxpayers to challenge federal
undercover activities. Whether White will set
a trend leading to these developments, how-
ever, is difficult to say. At present, the only
foreseeable result of White, which is neverthe-
less a significant one, is the establishment for
the first time of an effective remedy for the
general public against state and local govern-
ment snooping.
sembly, the third amendment prohibition against
quartering soldiers in the home, the fourth amend-
ment search and seizure provisions, the fifth amend-
ment self-incrimination clause, and the ninth
amendment reservation of unenumerated rights to
the people. The court applied the right of privacy
to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
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